Bullet Proof Your Portfolios: Lessons from An Insider

A Bullet Proof Portfolio

‘Lessons from An Insider’

Article Writer: Kipley J. Lytel, CFA

After spending several years working in the hedge fund world, followed by another (too long) period working as a lead ‘sell-side’ securities anal= yst for a securities brokerage house issuing ratings and price targets on securities in tandem with published research reports, my concern for indivi= dual investor’s welfare has markedly increased. That said, rumors of conflicts of interests are widespread and, in my opinion, have been quite valid for seve= ral reasons: (i) yes, analysts are often directly or indirectly pressured for positive ratin= gs and lofty price targets on securities from investment banking departments (bonus incentive), from trading desks (to sell more), and from the companies covered (for better access); (ii) yes, brokers are often encouraged to acti= vely trade accounts, often to the disservice of their clients; and, (iii) the sy= stem is fraught with inappropriate incentives, such as loads for mutual funds so= ld and poor price transparency on corporate bonds traded to customers in which= the brokerage company handsomely profits from a ‘hidden spread’ = 211; often 0.5% up to as high as 1.5% of value, on top of the commission.

But there are also many other pitfalls that aver= age investors have fallen prey, such as actively trading their own accounts (fr= om day trading to week trading now) or owning individual stocks without understanding diversification and exposure to sector or asset class risk. Indeed, research shows that over 9= 0% of the return is attributable to proper selection of and allocation between as= set classes, rather than stock "picking." In my opinion, the costs of trading or the risk of holding individual securities is simply dangerous without financial stock knowledge, ‘living and breathing’ the market and having diverse holdings. And if you use a broker, you must ask yourself these questions: Does your broker listen to the company conference calls? Does your broker have access to management? Do you think your broker wants to call you when one of your stocks just blew up with an accounting scandal, management corruption or disappointing earnings? Even if the brokerage house has an= alysts covering these matters, how involved is your broker in the process and is he brave enough to tell you to “sell & sell now” – not to mention was it appropriate for this stock or bond to be in your portfolio in the first place? And even if = you are lucky enough to have a brilliant broker, if you didn’t act in the first ten minutes of the breaking news, you likely missed your chance to li= mit your losses.

So what do you do? Do you buy a mixture of stock and = bond mutual funds, and if so which ones and how much of each? The answer goes beyond your return requirement, risk tolerance, individual constraints (liquidity, taxes, inco= me needs etc.) or even your age and size of financial assets. Granted, you must consider all the= se factors, but for the appropriate investment allocation to be correctly implemented, it should involve a degree ‘financial science.’ First, let me educate you on Modern Portfolio Theory.

Modern Portfolio Theory advocates a process first developed by Nobel Laureate Harry Markowitz, of selecting an optimal mix of asset classes based on past and forecast return= s, volatility (i.e., standard deviation and beta values), and cross relationsh= ips (i.e. correlations and co-variances) that matches investor's quantifiable r= isk tolerance and gives them best possible rate of return. The goal is to have a low covarian= ce portfolio based on each investors risk profile and return requirement so th= at the mean-variance is optimized (this is technical but I will make it clearer). Indeed, an addition= of a high-risk asset class with low correlation with the overall portfolio may actually increase the portfolio return and reduce overall risk.

Investors used to take comfort in the notion tha= t a portfolio diversified among domestic stocks and bonds would provide suffici= ent returns at the price of only moderate risk. There was good reason for this com= fort. Many investors have been aware of = the important role that correlation between portfolio components plays in determining the risk of a portfolio. The lower the correlation, the better, which used to be exactly what domestic stock and bond investors experienced. From 1926 to 1969, the correlation between annual total returns for = U.S. stocks and bonds was = an attractive -0.02. Today, U.S. stock and bond markets mostly move in the same direction. This tendency is reflected in the correlation that was 0.23 from 1970 to 1980 and 0.58 from 1981 to 1998. This lack of diversification, in combination with attractive returns observed in other asset classes, drives the vigor with which opportunities in non-traditional (or alternative) asset classes have been pursued in recent years. (Investing in Hard Assets, A Diversification Tool for Portfolios, Ibbotson Associates 1999)

Here is the problem, many assets have become more correlated, markets have become more correlated and countries have become m= ore correlated. This is especiall= y the case in market crashes, technically termed as negative gamma events. That is the problem, just wh= en you want your low correlated portfolio to constrain volatility it is at its greatest risk.

What is the solution? Well, I will discuss in broad term= s the correct approach to bullet proof your portfolio, but let me first acknowled= ge that the financial knowledge and investment tools to construct the optimal allocation are likely only found with experienced investment professionals = or advisor that practice Modern Portfolio Management. But, of course, if you choose to &= #8216;go-it alone’ here is a road map to navigate.

I suggest that you need to consider a host of new investment classes open to individual investors to mitigate this risk and t= hese include hard assets, hybrid stock strategies and hedge fund strategies. This serves two purposes: First, these assets have very low correlation with bonds and stocks and each other and, Second, one flaw I find with Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) is that= it is predicated on markets being efficient.&nbs= p; Let’s just say that there are strategies that benefit from inefficiencies in the market and by exploiting these anomalies the market g= ets more efficient – though, in my opinion not perfectly. Now by having a portfolio with substantial allocation to alternative class investments you benefit from low correlation attributes (lower risk) and in my opinion, these asset strategi= es partly offset MPT’s flawed paradigm that = all markets are efficient. <= /o:p>

In a December 2, 1996, article in Baron'= s, the newspaper had the following to say about Harvard Management Company's C= hief Executive Officer:

&q= uot;In the months after arriving from the Rockefeller Foundation back in 1990, one= of his biggest decisions was to settle on diversification as a key theme. Rely= ing on techniques of modern portfolio theory to get the best returns with lowest level of risk, Harvard needed to cut its exposure to publicly traded U.S st= ocks and bonds, and increase its investments in foreign stocks, commodities and private companies. The result: Right now the Harvard endowment has about on= ly half its portfolio in U.S. stocks and bonds, versus about 75% for the typical university endowment.&qu= ot;

Let me start by saying, I would suggest you do n= ot invest in any single company or fund for the alternative class exposure. Just like individual stocks there = are too much event risk and you are better served with pooled holdings. At my firm, Montecito Capital Management, we have between 25%-45% allocation to alterna= tive classes and only use liquid vehicles (easily sold) with broad holdings and = have nominal initial investments. = Also we steer away from many hedge funds that have long minimum holding periods, short performance histories and avoid hedged strategy funds using over 25% leverage. One must be vigilant with hedge fund vehicles as they often are n= ot regulated by SEC and are known for self-serving fees.

Nonetheless, hedge funds, when added to a traditional portfolio of stocks and bonds, both improved returns and reduced risk. According to Van Hedge Fund Advisors, the average five-year net annual returns for the top 25% of U.S. Hedge Funds has been 20.4% for the first quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2002, compared to 5.6% for mutual funds during the same period. There are some new hedge fund products available for investment advisors to add to client portfolios that are quite unique which the average investors should consider. For example, there = is a Hedge Funds S&P Index which has performed about 9% annually over the pa= st five years that will become available to advisors next month. This product does not have a ‘qualified investor’ mandate (net worth of $1,000,000 or invest= or having income of $200,000+ in past two years) and has an affordable minimum investment of $25,000 with only a one-year holding period (can exit early b= ut pay exit load if before one year). Further, the index has many subclass of s= tyles, which will eventually be open to investors & these include: merger arbitrage, long/short equity, equity neutral, fixed income arbitrage, convertible arbitrage, special situations etc.

You can also synthetically design many of these types of hedge funds (though you can’t get the levered returns of pri= vate funds) through mutual funds, which are usually classified as ‘hybrid domestic.’ There is a m= erger fund, an arbitrage fund, long/neutral funds, short funds, bond arbitrage fu= nds and convertible arbitrage funds available to the average investor. But stay away from loads and be mi= ndful that though the expenses are typically higher for alternative styles, we of= fset the weighted average expense with dynamic asset allocation between a select= ion of over 100 exchange traded funds in which we adjust correlation exposure by sector, styles, market capitalization etc. (note: the low average 0.25% expenses help offsets the overall high expense of alternate class funds).

Turning to hard assets, these classes represent = the ultimate in tangibility: real estate, precious metals, oil and gas, timber = and other commodities. Cyclical and volatile, these investments have long been considered ideal portfolio diversifiers because of their relative low correlation to the stock market. Real assets may be divided into "hard" and "soft" assets. Hard assets are non-perishable real assets and include real estate = and commodity-related assets such as energy (e.g., oil and gas), precious metals (e.g., gold and silver), industrial metals (e.g., aluminum and copper), and timber. "Soft" assets are perishable and consumable and include t= he commodities of agricultural products and livestock. The inclusion of hard a= ssets can potentially improve performance. The higher efficient frontier is deriv= ed from an optimization that includes hard assets into consideration.

Like real estate, commodities -- oil, lumber and other hard assets -- have a decent record of negative correlation with stoc= ks. Inflation sends the price of these hard assets up and it hurts the stock market. For example, the non-correlation between stocks and commodities was dramatically highlighted during 1973 and 1974 where stocks dropped 41% and commodity prices soared 1= 14%. During the S&P's two worst declines during = the past decade, managed futures recorded net profits. Also during September to November 1987, when the S&P 500 fell nearly 30 percent, managed futures rose 10%. And, the three-year= return of Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (annualized from June 2002) is 10.91% - we invest in this class through the PIMCO Commodity Real Return, among other funds.

One can also cobble together a "precious me= tals index" which will estimate the long-term return of this asset. The Morningstar database of mutual funds has a precious metals fund index which goes back to 1976, and before that the Van Eck International Fund, which started operations in 1956, became a precious metals fund sometime in 1968. Combining the Van Eck data for 1969-75 with the Morningstar data beginning = in 1976 provides a 27.75 year time series -- just long enough to provide a reasonable estimate of the "true" long term return of this asset.= The results are startling -- the annualized return from January 1969 to Septemb= er 1996 was 12.81%. This is actually higher than the S&P500 (11.24%), US small stocks (12.44%)= , and the EAFE (12.52%) for the same period. There is probably a few percent of survivorship bias built into this data, but the fact remains that the long = term returns of precious metals equity and other common stocks are probably quite similar. Precious metals investing has another, = more subtle advantage as well, it adds return and lowers risk to the overall portfolio if allocated correctly. Trouble is, there are so few good ways to tap into that hedge with liquidity, but among the few, we use USAA Precious Metals and Minerals fund= . (source: Efficient Frontier, William Bernstein).

Additionally, the natural resources class typica= lly moves independent of bonds and stocks. The Lipper Nat= ural Resources Index fourth quarter return was 7.56%, with a 7.92% average return from inception in 1995. Among= the many natural resource vehicles we use are the iShares<= /span> Goldman Sachs Natural Resources Index fund, which is up 1% year-to-date, however, it is a bit to concentrated in energy s= o we usually blend this hard asset allocation with a couple funds. We also = may want to underweight positions in one of these areas (e.g. energy) & may use more of Ivy Global Natural Resources since it has both mo= re international exposure and lower energy positions (under 50%) relative to i= ts peers. We also like the Oppen= heimer Real Asset fund marked by its a low correlation, unique strategy, performan= ce, no load, palatable expense & high bond positions as opposed to peer's u= sing more equity. Like the other alternative classes, this investment class adds both return with less risk given it is appropriately applied to a portfolio.

Finally, we turn to one of the most common alternative classes, real estate investment trusts (REIT). We prefer REI= Ts that have exposure to many different asset classes (office, shopping malls, retail & apartments) and broad geographic markets (not just one regional presence). Just as the bear m= arket began in earnest in early 2000, REITs began the= ir impressive winning streak. From March 31, 2000= , to Sept. 30, 2002, Morningstar's REIT fund index gained 40.8%, wh= ile the S&P 500 suffered a devastating 43.7% loss. REITs = finished near around the top 10% of all industry groups for the third year in the ro= w. REITs also offer a dividend yield of around 7% or 8% = with little worry that the dividend will be cut. Among the many funds we like is= the Undiscovered Managers REIT.

Alternative asset classes are hard to understand and unless advisors understand the nuances of modern portfolio management, many advisors contin= ue to steer clear from alternative investments, specifically hard assets. They look and say, ‘Go= sh, look at the poor returns and volatility. How can that possibly help my client?" Except when you= sit down and do the math, a 5% to 15% allocation of hard assets goes a long way= in reducing overall portfolio volatility, while improving returns.<= /span>

Now let’s pull this together. A typical investor who wants expos= ure to the overall market but lower downside risk must understand the upside will = be capped. That is how it works = since risk and reward are interrelated. &nb= sp; A typical investor may be a client with no immediate investment inco= me needs and doesn’t plan to retire for over 10 years and financial asse= ts of $500,000. Given the earnin= gs visibility remains poor, we are at war, fiscal and monetary polices have be= come more futile and we now face terrorism threats, our portfolio for a typical client may resemble this: (i) 30% exchange trad= ed equity funds with different exposures to value/growth, market cap sizes and sectors (we are more value, and weighted in defensive sectors like consumer staples, consumer non-cyclicals, healthcare etc= .); (ii) 35% alternative classes (arbitrage funds, long/short, neutral, opportu= nity strategies etc.); (iii) 12.5% hybrid fixed income (high yield, distressed, convertible bond); (iv) 12.5% hard assets (REITs, Commodity, Precious Metals & Natural Resources); and (v) 10% corporate bonds, mortgage backed-securities, TIPs & treasuries. Also remember tha= t you should have exposure to international markets with a speck of emerging mark= ets too, for both equity and fixed income allocation (we currently are overweig= ht in countries like Canada, Australia and Thailand). Keep in mind on an ongoing basis we dynamically adjust these weightings based on sector, economic and asset cla= ss prospects in tandem with Modern Portfolio Theory. Use this roadmap as a broad guide,= but read up on this subject first or seek advice from a professional that has t= he appropriate experience and academic pedigree to execute this approach.=

Kipley J. Lytel, CFA, is Senior Partn= er at Montecito Capital Management (ht= tp://www.mcapitalmgt.com). He received his Masters of Business Administration (MBA) with Honors from the Peter F. Dru= cker School of Management at Claremont<= span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Times;mso-b= idi-font-family: "Times New Roman"'> Graduate University, where he also received his undergraduate Bachelors of = Arts (BA) degree in Economics. Mr. Lytel is a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) = and an active member of the Association of Investment Management and Research (AIMR) and the Los Angeles Society of Financial Analysts (LASFA). He also serves as a Senior Grader for AIMR's CFA Examin= ation.